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context,	 Northern	 Ireland	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 particularly	 vulnerable.	 This	 article	 examines	 the	
referendum	 campaign	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 by	 detailing	 input	 from	 the	 Northern	 Ireland	
administration,	 political	 parties,	 civil	 society	 and	 external	 figures.	 The	 article	 suggests	 that	 the	
overall	referendum	campaign	in	Northern	Ireland	was	hamstrung	by	the	opposing	positions	taken	by	
key	 political	 protagonists,	 particularly	 Sinn	 Féin	 and	 the	 Democratic	 Unionist	 Party	 (DUP).	 This	
produced	 a	 challenging	 context	 for	 the	 referendum	 debate	 in	 Northern	 Ireland.	 The	 post-
referendum	 period	 has	 also	 been	 marked	 by	 persistent	 differences	 in	 relation	 to	 how	 best	 to	
approach	specific	Northern	Ireland	issues	and	challenges.	A	continued	absence	of	clear	positions	and	





2016	 has	 brought	 a	 series	 of	 political	 shocks	 and	 surprises	 across	 the	Western	 democratic	world.	
Disaffected	 voters	 have	 delivered	 unexpected	 referendum	 and	 election	 results	 which	 profoundly	
challenge	 existing	 governance	 arrangements.	 The	UK’s	 decision	 to	 leave	 the	 European	Union	 (EU)	
following	 a	 referendum	 in	 June	2016	 fundamentally	 alters	 the	 country’s	 relationship	with	 the	 EU,	
with	 its	 European	neighbours,	with	 the	 rest	 of	 the	world	 and	potentially	with	 its	 own	 constituent	
units.	The	 impact	of	 the	vote	 remains	difficult	 to	qualify	and	quantify,	but	 it	 is	clear	 that	different	




The	EU	has	played	a	 subtle	 role	 in	 supporting	Northern	 Ireland	 since	 the	UK	acceded	 to	 the	 then	
European	 Community	 in	 1973.	 EU	 support	 for	 successive	 domestic	 peace	 efforts	 has	 been	
underscored	 by	 financial	 commitments	 and	 initiatives	 (see	 Hayward	 and	 Murphy	 2012	 for	 an	
overview).	In	turn,	support	for	the	EU	in	Northern	Ireland	has	typically	been	stronger	than	in	other	






campaign	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 was	 hamstrung	 by	 the	 opposing	 positions	 taken	 by	 key	 political	
protagonists,	 particularly	 Sinn	 Féin	 and	 the	 Democratic	 Unionist	 Party	 (DUP).	 This	 produced	 a	
challenging	context	for	the	referendum	debate	in	Northern	Ireland.	The	post-referendum	period	has	
also	been	marked	by	persistent	 differences	 in	 relation	 to	how	best	 to	 approach	 specific	Northern	
Ireland	 issues	 and	 challenges.	 A	 continued	 absence	 of	 clear	 positions	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 contingency	




















the	operation	of	direct	 rule.	 The	 conflict	dominated	political	discourse	and	discussion	 in	Northern	
Ireland,	 to	 the	 point	 where	 other	 policy	 priorities	 were	 side-lined.	 And	 nor	 did	 the	 specific	
governance	arrangements	which	pertained	until	the	signing	of	the	1998	Belfast	Agreement	facilitate	
a	high	degree	of	 regional	autonomy.	The	operation	of	direct	 rule	effectively	allowed	the	Northern	
Ireland	 political	 class	 to	 distance	 themselves	 from	 conventional	 political	 and	 policy	 debates.	 The	
introduction	 of	 devolution	 in	 1999	 altered	Northern	 Ireland’s	 constitutional	 status	within	 the	UK.	
The	 region	was	 granted	 advanced	 decentralised	 powers	which	were	 to	 be	managed	 by	 a	 directly	
elected	cross-community	Assembly	and	Executive.	This	move	demanded	much	of	Northern	Ireland’s	
political	parties	and	personnel.	 It	 required	the	new	administration	to	engage	more	robustly	with	a	
‘normal’	 policy	 agenda	 and	 less	 with	 constitutional	 and	 security	 issues.	 For	 the	 first	 time	 in	
generations,	Northern	Ireland	politicians	began	to	grapple	with	a	range	of	pressing	socio-economic	
challenges	 across	 policy	 portfolios	 including	 health,	 education,	 welfare	 and	 the	 environment.	
Contrasting	 pro-	 and	 anti-EU	 party	 positions	 sometimes	 impacted	 on	 the	 outputs	 of	 the	 local	







for	 its	 relationship	with	 the	 EU.	 In	 addition,	 Northern	 Ireland’s	 distinctive	 political	 features	mean	
that	debate	and	discussion	 takes	place	 in	an	altogether	different	political	 and	 social	environment.	
The	 region’s	 consociational	 devolution	 arrangement	 and	 a	 dual	 ethnic	 party	 system	 make	 for	 a	
distinctive	and	unusual	political	context.		
The	devolved	power-sharing	Northern	 Ireland	Executive	 is	composed	of	political	parties	 from	both	
sides	 of	 the	 political	 divide	 and	 a	 series	 of	 specific	 arrangements	 exists	 to	manage	 and	 legitimise	
decision	 making	 and	 the	 legislative	 process.	 This	 political	 system	 was	 explicitly	 designed	 to	
accommodate	and	to	protect	the	rights	and	 interests	of	the	two	communities	 in	Northern	 Ireland.	
The	 system	 is	 subject	 to	 some	 criticism,	 including	 the	 charge	 that	 opposing	 political	 parties	 may	
often	face	difficulties	 in	reaching	agreement	on	contentious	 issues.	This	scenario	was	apparent	for	






Scotland	and	Wales	–	 the	Northern	 Ireland	Executive	did	not	produce	a	position	paper	on	 the	EU	
referendum.	The	Northern	Ireland	Draft	Programme	for	Government	Framework	2016-2021	did	not	
include	consideration	of	a	possible	Brexit	and	its	 implications	for	Northern	Ireland.	A	lack	of	clarity	
and	 unity	 on	 this	 question	 extended	 to	 the	Northern	 Ireland	 Assembly	where	 there	was	minimal	
discussion	of	 the	referendum.	Assembly	Committees,	 such	as	 the	Committee	of	 the	then	Office	of	
the	 First	Minister	 and	Deputy	 First	Minister	 (OFMDFM)	 did	 not	 include	 reference	 to	 the	 EU	 in	 its	
strategic	 priorities	 for	 2014/2015.	 ‘European	 issues’	 was	 an	 indicative	 committee	 priority	 for	
2015/2016,	 but	 in	 the	 immediate	 run-up	 to	 the	 referendum,	 the	 committee	 (since	 renamed	 the	
Committee	of	the	Executive	Office)	did	not	engage	to	any	extensive	degree	with	the	question	of	EU	
membership.	 Other	 sectoral	 committees	 did	 consider	 the	 referendum.	 The	 Enterprise	 Committee	
investigated	the	economic	implications	for	Northern	Ireland	of	a	Brexit.	The	Briefing	Note	(produced	
by	 the	Open	University)	estimated	 that	economic	output	 in	Northern	 Ireland	would	be	3	per	 cent	





very	 minor	 players.	 In	 Northern	 Ireland,	 the	 EU	 has	 never	 stirred	 the	 same	 level	 or	 intensity	 of	
political	debate	as	in	other	parts	of	the	UK.	The	SDLP	has	long	been	the	most	strident	in	its	support	
for	 the	 EU	 and	 continued	 EU	membership.	 The	 party,	 and	 in	 particular	 its	 young	 leader,	 were	 a	
strong	and	vocal	advocate	for	Remain.	Sinn	Féin’s	support	for	the	EU	has	altered	over	time.	Opposed	
to	successive	EU	referendums	on	EU	treaties	in	the	Republic	of	Ireland,	the	party	opted	to	support	
the	Remain	side	 in	Northern	 Ireland.	The	party	position	was	 influenced	by	Sinn	Féin’s	belief	that	a	










Ireland	Assembly	election	which	 took	place	 just	 a	 few	weeks	prior	 to	23	 June.	During	 this	period,	
parties	were	heavily	focused	on	election	campaigns	and	local	issues.	Electioneering	did	not	tend	to	
include	 any	 substantial	 consideration	 of	 the	 upcoming	 referendum.	 Political	 engagement	 with	
referendum	 issues	did	 get	more	pronounced	 in	 the	weeks	 immediately	before	 the	 vote,	but	even	
then,	the	overall	impression	is	of	a	campaign	which	lacked	energy,	depth	and	momentum.		
Similarly	 to	 the	 rest	of	 the	UK,	 the	voices	 for	Leave	and	Remain	were	 filtered	 through	 two	official	
campaign	 groups.	 Britain	 Stronger	 in	 Europe	 and	 Vote	 Leave	 established	 branches	 in	 Northern	
Ireland	and	both	groups	focused	largely	on	general	topics	relevant	to	the	broader	UK	debate,	with	
some	 limited	discussion	of	Northern	 Ireland	specific	 concerns.	Sectoral	bodies	and	 interest	groups	




2015).	 The	 local	 Northern	 Ireland	 media	 covered	 the	 referendum	 campaign,	 and	 that	 coverage	









more	 broadly	 across	 the	 UK.	 Much	 of	 the	 wider	 Irish	 political	 establishment	 harboured	 deep	
concerns	about	the	impact	of	a	possible	Brexit	on	the	Republic	of	Ireland.	The	issue	was	categorised	
as	a	strategic	threat	to	Ireland’s	national	interest	(see	Department	of	the	Taoiseach	2016).		
The	 major	 campaign	 issues	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 were	 somewhat	 different	 from	 those	 which	
animated	discussion	elsewhere.	Immigration	was	discussed	but	to	a	lesser	extent.	Those	opposed	to	
Brexit	 in	Northern	 Ireland	were	more	concerned	about	 the	political	 and	economic	 impact	of	a	UK	
exit	 from	 the	 EU	 on	 the	 border	 between	 Northern	 Ireland	 and	 the	 Republic	 of	 Ireland.	 The	
implications	 for	 free	movement,	 trade	 and	 the	 peace	 process	were	 key	 referendum	 themes	 (and	
these	 were	 issues	 which	 also	 exercised	 the	 Irish	 government).	 The	 question	 of	 EU	 funding,	
particularly	 future	access	 to	 structural	 funds,	 the	Peace	Programme	and	 the	Common	Agricultural	





Boris	 Johnson.	Those	supportive	of	Remain	were	helped	by	contributions	 from	senior	UK	and	 Irish	







themes	which	the	referendum	discussion	touched	upon	 in	 terms	of	 the	UK’s	constitutional	 future,	
the	status	of	the	border	between	Northern	Ireland	and	the	Republic	of	Ireland	and	the	impact	of	the	






















the	 Remain	 side.	 The	 notion	 that	 their	 constitutional	 preference	 for	 unity	 with	 the	 UK	 has	 now	
diminished	or	disappeared	is	imprudent.		
The	Northern	Ireland	result,	however,	does	reveal	a	clear	East-West	divide	in	Northern	Ireland.	11	of	
the	 18	 constituencies	 there	 voted	 Remain,	 including	 the	 Belfast	 constituencies	 and	 all	 border	
constituencies.	A	Leave	result	was	recorded	in	all	Eastern	constituencies,	whilst	those	constituencies	
represented	 by	 a	 nationalist	 or	 independent	 MP	 returned	 a	 vote	 in	 favour	 of	 continued	 EU	
membership.	In	fact,	the	Foyle	constituency	recorded	the	fourth	highest	Remain	vote	(78.3	per	cent)	
of	 all	 UK	 constituencies.	 Three	 constituencies	 with	 Unionist	 representation	 in	 Westminster	 also	
supported	Remain.	The	seven	constituencies	which	voted	Leave	were	all	Unionist	in	orientation.		
This	 referendum	outcome	 is	 interesting	because	 it	 does	not	 demonstrate	 the	 existence	of	 a	 stark	
communal	divide.	A	simplistic	nationalist/unionist	explanation	 for	 the	Northern	 Ireland	vote	 is	not	
convincing	(Mills	and	Colvin	2016).	This	is	also	confirmed	by	an	Ipsos-Mori	poll	which	found	that	40	
per	cent	of	Protestant	voters	 in	Northern	Ireland	wanted	the	UK	to	stay	in	the	EU	(McBride	2016).	
Related	 research	 by	Garry	 (2016:	 2)	 notes	 that:	 ‘two	 thirds	 of	 self-described	 “unionists”	 voted	 to	
leave	while	almost	90	per	cent	of	self-described	“nationalists”	voted	to	remain’.	Unionists	were	less	
influenced	 by	 their	 party’s	 position	 than	 nationalists	 were.	 A	 larger	 proportion	 of	 Unionists	 than	




for	 the	 UK	 to	 stay	 in	 the	 EU	 while	 fewer	 than	 50	 per	 cent	 of	 manual	 workers	 did.	 Attitudes	 to	
immigration	were	also	predictors	of	vote	choice	with	those	opposed	to	 immigration	more	 likely	to	
vote	Leave.	Northern	 Ireland	attitudes	mirror	 some	of	 the	deeper	 socio-economic	concerns	which	
motivated	voters	across	the	UK	as	a	whole:	
In	short	there	does	seem	to	be	evidence	supporting	the	idea	that	there	is	a	cluster	of	
traits	 (low	 education	 and	 skill)	 and	 beliefs	 (anti	 immigrant,	 socially	 conservative,	





Questions	 about	 the	 status	 of	 the	 Irish	 border	 after	 Brexit	 have	dominated	discourse	 in	Northern	
Ireland	since	 the	 referendum	result.	Membership	of	 the	EU	single	market	has	effectively	 removed	
the	 border	 between	 Northern	 Ireland	 and	 the	 Republic	 of	 Ireland,	 and	 this	 has	 altered	 not	 just	
economic	relations	on	the	 island	but	political	 relations	too.	 In	2014,	cross-border	trade	was	worth	
over	 300	 million	 EUR	 (InterTradeIreland	 2016a).	 Since	 the	 Brexit	 vote,	 25	 per	 cent	 of	 Northern	
Ireland	 companies	 and	57	per	 cent	of	 Irish	 companies	 think	Brexit	will	 have	a	negative	 impact	on	
cross-border	sales.	A	majority	of	Northern	Ireland	firms	(62	per	cent)	are	keen	to	continue	to	have	
access	to	the	single	market	and	free	movement	of	people	(InterTradeIreland	2016b).	In	terms	of	free	
movement,	 the	 status	of	 the	Common	Travel	Area	 (CTA)	between	 Ireland	and	 the	UK	 is	 now	also	
under	 scrutiny.	How,	 indeed	 if,	 the	benefits	of	 this	 arrangement	 can	be	protected	post-Brexit	 has	
been	one	of	the	key	concerns	for	Northern	Ireland	and	the	Irish	government	too.		
The	hard	or	soft	character	of	the	border	post-Brexit	is,	therefore,	of	substantial	significance	to	both	












…	 the	 reimposition	 of	 a	 formalised	 border	would	 be	 a	 radical	 departure	 from	 the	
established	strategy	of	the	administrations	 in	Dublin,	London	and	Belfast.	Anything	
in	 my	 view	 that	 strengthened	 a	 sense	 of	 separatism	 between	 Northern	 and	




Whether	 a	 hard	 or	 soft	 border	 materialises	 has	 potentially	 profound	 political	 and	 economic	









UK	 has	 been	mooted	 as	 a	means	 to	 allow	 for	 a	 soft	 border	 to	 exist	 on	 the	 island	 of	 Ireland.	 The	
political	ramifications	of	such	a	move,	however,	and	perhaps	more	especially	its	symbolic	effect,	can	
be	construed	as	creating	a	de	 facto	united	 Ireland,	a	proposition	which	 is	vehemently	opposed	by	
Unionists.		
The	Northern	 Ireland	 Executive’s	 response	 to	 the	 referendum	outcome	has	been	minimal.	A	 joint	
letter	to	the	Prime	Minister	from	the	First	Minister	and	Deputy	First	Minister	outlines	key	concerns	
for	 Northern	 Ireland	 during	 this	 new	 era.	 It	 emphasises	 concerns	 about	 the	 border,	 and	 it	 also	
references	other	areas	 including	trade,	energy,	EU	funding	and	the	agri-food	and	fisheries	 industry	
where	the	Northern	Ireland	Executive	wishes	to	be	involved	and	engaged	in	protecting	key	interests.	
Beyond	 this	 limited	 show	 of	 cross-party	 unity	 however,	 there	 is	 no	 clear	 contingency	 plan	 in	
Northern	Ireland.	McGowan	(2016)	notes	how	problematic	this	is:	
many	of	Northern	Ireland’s	core	priorities	–	such	as	agriculture	and	fishing	–	may	be	




recent	motion	endorsing	a	proposal	 that	 there	should	be	 legal	 recognition	of	 the	unique	status	of	
Northern	 Ireland	and	the	circumstances	on	the	 island	as	part	of	the	arrangements	to	 leave	the	EU	
was	defeated	by	a	single	vote	on	17	October	2016.	The	 fractious	debate	which	preceded	the	vote	
further	underlines	the	absence	of	an	agreed	strategy	in	Northern	Ireland	and	highlights	the	division	






Ireland	 (see	 Northern	 Ireland	 Assembly	 2016).	 This	 additional	 lack	 of	 political	 cohesion	 and	 unity	
limits	the	strength	of	Northern	Ireland’s	position	during	the	various	negotiations	to	come.	
There	 are	 other	 avenues	 too,	 including	 the	 Northern	 Ireland	 Assembly	 committees	 and	 the	
institutions	 created	 by	 the	 1998	 Belfast	 Agreement,	 namely	 the	 North-South	 Ministerial	 Council	
(NSMC)	and	the	British-Irish	Council	(BIC).	The	Northern	Ireland	Assembly	committees	have	not	been	
vociferous	 in	 their	 examination	 of	 the	 referendum	 vote.	 There	 has	 been	 only	 limited	 committee	
discussion	 of	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 result,	 and	 there	 are	 no	 plans	 to	 convene	 an	 inquiry	 or	
consultation.	This	contrasts	with	the	work	of	other	parliaments,	 in	London	and	Dublin,	which	have	
engaged	in	deeper	examination	of	the	impact	of	Brexit	on	relations	with	Ireland.		
There	 has	 been	 some	 tentative	 engagement	 with	 other	 institutions.	 The	 BIC,	 in	 particular,	 may	
become	 an	 interesting	 forum	 for	 the	 UK’s	 regions	 and	 nations	 to	 communicate	 their	 views.	 An	
extraordinary	meeting	of	the	Council	took	place	in	Cardiff	on	22	July	2016	to	discuss	the	implications	
of	 Brexit.	 A	 new	 Joint	 Ministerial	 Committee	 on	 EU	 Negotiations	 (JMC(EN))	 will	 be	 the	 primary	
vehicle	 for	 agreeing	 a	 UK	 approach	 to	 the	 Article	 50	 negotiations	 and	 for	 accommodating	 the	
interests	of	all	constituent	units	of	the	UK.	Irish	government	attempts	to	harness	an	all-island	cross-
party	and	cross-sectoral	approach	to	Brexit	have	been	thwarted	by	Unionist	non-participation	in	the	
All-Island	 Civic	 Dialogue	 on	 Brexit	 which	 convened	 in	 Dublin	 on	 2	 November	 2016.	 The	 initiative,	





pronounced	challenges	 for	 the	Union,	 for	 the	UK,	 its	neighbours	and	 its	 constituent	units.	 The	UK	
wide	referendum	has	been	criticised	for	the	way	in	which	it	allowed	unchecked	commentary	on	the	
EU	 (by	 both	 Leavers	 and	 Remainers)	 to	 inform	 the	 narrative.	 The	 quality	 of	 the	 debate	 and	 the	
discussion	 suffered	 (see	 Liddle	 2016).	 In	 Northern	 Ireland,	 the	 bigger	 issue	was	 not	 so	much	 the	
quality	 of	 the	 debate,	 rather	 the	 limited	 and	 late	 amount	 of	 debate.	 The	 Northern	 Ireland	
administration,	political	parties	and	civil	society	were	slower	to	engage	with	key	referendum	issues.	
The	 quality	 of	 debate	was	 also	 restricted	 by	 a	 lack	 of	 information,	 data	 and	 expertise	 specifically	
relevant	to	Northern	Ireland.		
The	 referendum	 result	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 produced	 majority	 support	 for	 Remain	 and	 revealed	
some	 cross-party	 and	 cross-community	 support	 for	 this	 outcome.	 It	 also	 produced	 a	 result	which	
conflicts	with	that	of	the	UK	as	a	whole	and	begs	questions	about	how	to	accommodate	Northern	
Ireland’s	 preference.	 The	 possibility	 of	 a	 ‘special	 arrangement’	 for	 Northern	 Ireland	 has	 been	
mooted,	but	 there	 is	 little	 clarity	about	 the	detail	 of	 such	a	 scenario.	 The	 seeming	 inability	of	 the	
parties	to	the	Northern	Ireland	Executive	and	Assembly	to	agree	and	to	implement	a	framework	for	
dealing	with	Brexit	diminishes	the	strength	of	Northern	Ireland	input	to	the	wider	process	of	the	UK	
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